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Abstract
The Iowa gambling task (IGT) is one of the most popular tasks used to study decisionmaking deficits in clinical populations. In order to decompose performance on the IGT
in its constituent psychological processes, several cognitive models have been proposed
(e.g., the Expectancy Valence (EV) and Prospect Valence Learning (PVL) models). Here
we present a comparison of three models—the EV and PVL models, and a combination
of these models (EV-PU)—based on the method of parameter space partitioning. This
method allows us to assess the choice patterns predicted by the models across their
entire parameter space. Our results show that the EV model is unable to account for a
frequency-of-losses effect, whereas the PVL and EV-PU models are unable to account for
a pronounced preference for the bad decks with many switches. All three models underrepresent pronounced choice patterns that are frequently seen in experiments. Overall, our
results suggest that the search of an appropriate IGT model has not yet come to an end.
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The Iowa gambling task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994) is a popular
neuropsychological paradigm used to assess decision-making deﬁcits in clinical populations. The IGT was originally developed to detect decision-making deﬁcits of patients
with lesions to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), but in the last two decades
it has been applied to a variety of clinical populations, such as patients with pathological
gambling disorder (Cavedini, Riboldi, Keller, D’Annucci, & Bellodi, 2002), attention deﬁcit
hyperactivity disorder (Agay, Yechiam, Carmel, & Levkovitz, 2010; Toplak, Jain, & Tannock, 2005), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Cavedini, Riboldi, D’Annucci, et al., 2002),
psychopathic tendencies (Blair, Colledge, & Mitchell, 2001), bipolar disorder (Brambilla
et al., 2012), and schizophrenia (Martino, Bucay, Butman, & Allegri, 2007; Premkumar et
al., 2008). In addition, the IGT has been applied to cocaine addicts (Stout, Busemeyer, Lin,
Grant, & Bonson, 2004), chronic cannabis users (Fridberg et al., 2010), traﬃc oﬀenders (Lev,
Hershkovitz, & Yechiam, 2008), and inmates (Yechiam, Kanz, et al., 2008).
The task contains four decks that diﬀer in their payoﬀ scheme. Participants are told
to choose cards so as to maximize their net proﬁt. The only way to accomplish this goal
in the IGT is to avoid risky decks that contain high immediate rewards but even higher
occasional losses, and instead prefer safe decks that contain small immediate rewards
but even smaller occasional losses. Impaired performance might be caused by several
factors, such as focusing on immediate rewards, avoidance of losses, or bad memory for
experienced payoﬀs. Thus, the IGT intends to measure the extent to which participants
learn to prefer decks that maximize their long-term outcomes.
In order to provide insights into the psychological processes that drive performance
on the IGT, several reinforcement-learning (RL) models have been proposed. The most
popular model of IGT data is the Expectancy Valence model (EV; Agay et al., 2010; Bass
& Nussbaum, 2010; Bishara et al., 2009; Brambilla et al., 2012; Brown, Anderson, Symington, & Paul, 2012; Busemeyer & Stout, 2002; Cella, Dymond, Cooper, & Turnbull, 2012;
de Visser et al., 2010; Escartin et al., 2012; Farah, Yechiam, Bekhor, Toledo, & Polus, 2008;
Gullo & Stieger, 2011; Hochman, Yechiam, & Bechara, 2010; Isella et al., 2008; Johnson,
Yechiam, Murphy, Queller, & Stout, 2006; Kester et al., 2006; Kjome et al., 2010; Lane,
Yechiam, & Busemeyer, 2006; Lev et al., 2008; Lovallo, Yechiam, Sorocco, Vincent, & Collins, 2006; Peatﬁeld, Parkinson, & Intriligator, 2012; Premkumar et al., 2008; Sevy et al.,
2006, 2007; Stout et al., 2004; van den Bos, Homberg, Gijsbers, Heijer, & Cuppen, 2009;
Wood, Busemeyer, Koling, Cox, & Davis, 2005; Yechiam, Busemeyer, Stout, & Bechara,
2005; Yechiam, Hayden, Bodkins, O’Donnell, & Hetrick, 2008; Yechiam, Kanz, et al., 2008;
Yechiam, Arshavsky, Shamay-Tsoory, Yaniv, & Aharon, 2010). Yechiam et al. (2005) ﬁt
the EV model to data of 10 clinical groups, and mapped these groups according to the
diﬀerences in the model parameters. This analysis shows that modeling IGT data provides deeper insights in the reasons for the decision-making deﬁcits of the 10 diﬀerent
disorders, and in relations between the disorders. The EV model has recently been chal-
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lenged by the Prospect Valence Learning model (PVL; Ahn, Busemeyer, Wagenmakers, &
Stout, 2008; Ahn, Krawitz, Kim, Busemeyer, & Brown, 2011; a detailed description of the
models can be found in the next section). Studies comparing these two models failed
to ﬁnd that one model was consistently superior to the other; instead they concluded
that combinations of the two models should be used to ﬁt IGT data (Ahn et al., 2008;
Fridberg et al., 2010; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005). These studies used various methods, such as the post hoc ﬁt criterion (Ahn et al., 2008; Fridberg et al., 2010; Yechiam &
Busemeyer, 2005), the generalization criterion (Ahn et al., 2008; Yechiam & Busemeyer,
2005), and simulation methods (Fridberg et al., 2010; a detailed review of these studies
can be found in the next section).
Here we present a diﬀerent approach to compare RL models for the IGT. Using a
method known as parameter space partitioning (PSP; Pitt, Kim, Navarro, & Myung, 2006;
Pitt, Myung, Montenegro, & Pooley, 2008), we aim to compare the ﬂexibility of three models
of the IGT: the EV model, PVL model, and a combination of these two models (i.e., EV-PU;
the EV model with Prospect Utility function of the PVL model, Ahn et al., 2008). We thus
aim to answer the question: Can each model generate typical empirical choice patterns
over a wide range of parameter settings? By applying PSP we can gain detailed insights
in diﬀerences between the three models and possible reasons for inconsistent results of
previous studies comparing these models.
The outline of this article is as follows. The ﬁrst section explains the IGT, outlines the
three RL models for the IGT, and reviews previous studies comparing this class of models.
In the second section, we compare these three models with respect to model ﬂexibility.
Section three summarizes our ﬁndings and discusses their ramiﬁcations.

The IGT and Three Reinforcement-Learning Models
The Iowa Gambling Task
The purpose of the IGT is to measure decision-making deﬁcits of clinical populations in an
experimental setting. In the traditional IGT, participants are initially given $2000 facsimile
money and are presented with four decks of cards. Participants are instructed to choose
cards in order to maximize their long-term outcomes (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997). Unbeknowst to the participants, the task typically contains
100 trials. After each choice, participants receive feedback on the rewards and the losses
(if any) associated with that card, and the running tally.
The task aims to determine whether participants learn to prefer the good, safe decks
over the bad, risky decks because this is the only choice pattern that maximizes the longterm outcomes. The good, safe decks are typically labelled as decks C and D, whereas
the bad, risky decks are labelled as decks A and B. Table 1 presents the traditional payoﬀ
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scheme as developed by Bechara et al. (1994). This table illustrates that decks A and B are
associated with high immediate, constant rewards, but with even higher unpredictable,
occasional losses resulting in negative long-term outcomes. Decks C and D, on the other
hand, are associated with lower immediate, constant rewards, but with even lower unpredictable, occasional losses and thus result in positive long-term outcomes. In addition
to the diﬀerent magnitude of the immediate rewards and occasional losses resulting in
diﬀerent long-term outcomes, the decks also diﬀer in the frequency of losses: Two decks
yield frequent losses (decks A and C) and two decks yield infrequent losses (decks B and D).
Table 1. Payoff scheme of the traditional IGT as developed by Bechara et al. (1994).
Deck A

Deck B

Bad deck with
frequent losses

Bad deck with in- Good deck with
frequent losses
frequent losses

Good deck with
infrequent losses

100

100

50

50

Number of losses/ 10 5
cards

1

5

1

Loss/10 cards

-1250

-1250

-250

-250

Net outcome/
10 cards

-250

-250

250

250

Reward/trial

Deck C

Deck D

Reinforcement-Learning Models
In this section, we describe the three RL models we aim to compare with respect to model
ﬂexibility: the EV, PVL, and EV-PU models. Table 2 contains the equations of each model and
the psychological interpretation of the free parameters including their ranges. In the following, we describe each model separately; the general idea, however, is that each model
describes the performance on the IGT through the interaction of distinct psychological
processes captured by the model parameters. The ﬁrst assumption of all models is that,
after each choice, participants evaluate the rewards and losses (if any) associated with
the just-chosen card by means of a utility function. These momentary utilities are used to
update expectancies about the utilities of each deck. This updating process entails that
participants adjust their expectancies based on the new utilities they experience, a process described by a learning rule. In the next step, the models assume that the expected
utilities of each deck are used to guide the choices of the participants. This assumption
is formalized by the softmax choice rule, also known as the ratio-of-strength choice rule,
that all three models use to compute the probability of choosing a particular deck on a
particular trial (Luce, 1959). This rule contains the sensitivity parameter, θ, that indexes the
extent to which trial-by-trial choices match the expected utilities of the decks. Values of θ
close to zero indicate a random choice behavior (i.e., strong exploration leading to many
switches), whereas large values of θ indicate a choice behavior that is strongly determined
by the expected utilities (i.e., strong exploitation leading to few switches).
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Table 2. Formalization of the three reinforcement-learning models.
Concept
Utility
function

Learning
rule
Choice rule

Model(s)

Model equation

Free parameter

Range

EV

uk(t) = (1 – w) × W(t) + w × L(t)

w: Loss aversion
parameter

[0, 1]

PVL, EV-PU uk(t) =

{

X(t)A 		
-w × |X(t)|A

if X(t) ≥ 0
if X(t) < 0

A: Shape parameter
[0, 1]
w: Loss aversion
[0, 5]
parameter

EV, EV-PU

Evk(t + 1) = (1 − a) × Evk(t) + a × uk(t)

a: Recency
parameter

[0, 1]

PVL

Evk(t + 1) = a × Evk(t) + δk(t) × uk(t)

a: Recency
parameter

[0, 1]

All

P[Sk(t + 1)] =

EV, EV-PU

θ(t) = (t/10)c

c: Consistency
parameter

[–5, 5]

PVL

θ = 3c – 1

c: Consistency
parameter

[0, 5]

Sensitivity

eθ(t)Evk
Σ eθ(t)Evj
4
j
=1

Note. W(t) and L(t) are the rewards and losses, respectively, on trial t. X(t) is the net outcome on trial t,
X(t) = W(t) − |L(t)|. δk(t) is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if deck k is chosen on trial t and 0 otherwise.

The Expectancy Valence model

The EV model uses three parameters to formalize its assumptions about participants’ performance on the IGT (Busemeyer & Stout, 2002). The ﬁrst model assumption is that after
choosing a card from deck k, k  {1, 2, 3, 4} on trial t, participants compute a weighted
mean of the experienced rewards, W(t), and losses, L(t), to obtain the utility of deck k on
trial t, uk(t). The weight that participants assign to losses relative to rewards, w, is the ﬁrst
model parameter, and is called the loss aversion parameter. A small value of w, that is, w
< .5, is characteristic for decision makers who put more weight on the rewards and can
thus be described as reward-seeking, whereas a large value of w, that is, w > .5, is characteristic for decision makers who put more weight on losses and can thus be described as
loss-averse (Ahn et al., 2008).
The EV model assumes that decision makers use the utility of deck k on trial t, uk(t),
to update only the expected utility of deck k, Evk(t + 1); the expected utilities of the unchosen decks are left unchanged. If the experienced utility, uk(t), is higher than expected,
the expected utility of deck k on trial t + 1 is adjusted upward. If the experienced utility,
uk(t), is lower than expected, the expected utility of deck k on trial t + 1 is adjusted downward. This updating process is inﬂuenced by the second model parameter—the recency
parameter, a. This parameter quantifies the memory for rewards and losses. A value of
close to zero indicates slow forgetting and weak recency eﬀects, whereas a value of a
close to one indicates rapid forgetting and strong recency eﬀects. For all models under
consideration, we initialized the expectancies of all decks to zero, Evk(0) = 0. This setting
reﬂects an absence of prior knowledge about the payoﬀs of the decks.
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According to the EV model, the sensitivity θ(t) included in the choice rule, changes
over trials depending on the response consistency parameter c. If c is positive, the sensitivity of trial-by-trial choices to the expected utilities of the decks increases over trials;
otherwise, the sensitivity decreases.
To sum up, the EV model has three parameters: (1) The loss aversion parameter, w,
which quantiﬁes the weight of losses over rewards, (2) the recency parameter, a, which
determines the memory for past expectancies, and (3) the response consistency parameter,
c, which determines the amount of exploration versus exploitation.
The Prospect Valence Learning model

The PVL model uses four parameters to formalize its assumptions about participants’
performance on the IGT (Ahn et al., 2008). The PVL model assumes that decision makers only process the net outcome after choosing a card from deck k, k  {1, 2, 3, 4} on
trial t, X(t)= W(t) −|L(t)|. In contrast to the linear utility function of the EV model, the PVL
model uses the Prospect Utility function—a non-linear utility function from prospect
theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). The Prospect Utility function contains the ﬁrst two
model parameters—the shape parameter, A, that determines the shape of the utility
function, and the loss aversion parameter, w. As A approaches zero, the shape of the
utility function approaches a step function. The implication of such a step function is
that given a positive net outcome, X(t), all utilities are similar because they approach
one, and given a negative net outcome, X(t), all utilities are also similar because they approach −w. On the other hand, as A approaches one, the subjective utility, uk(t), increases
in direct proportion to the net outcome, X(t). A value of w larger than one indicates a
larger impact of losses than rewards on the subjective utility, whereas a value of w of
one indicates equal impact of losses and rewards. As w approaches zero, the model
predicts that losses will be neglected.
Unlike the EV model, the PVL model assumes that, on every trial t, decision makers
update the expected utilities of every deck according to the Decay-RL rule. This rule
discounts expectancies of every deck on every trial to an extent depending on the
recency parameter, a. This means that, in contrast to the EV model, the expectancies
of the unchosen decks are discounted. The dummy variable in the learning rule, δk,
ensures that only the current utility of the chosen deck, k, is added to the expectancy
of that deck. A small value of a indicates rapid forgetting and strong recency eﬀects,
whereas a large value of a indicates slow forgetting and weak recency eﬀects. Note
that the interpretation of the recency parameter, a, of the EV model is reversed in the
PVL model.
The PVL model assumes a trial-independent sensitivity parameter θ, which depends
on the ﬁnal model parameter: response consistency c. Small values of c cause a random
choice pattern, whereas large values of c cause a deterministic choice pattern.
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To sum up, the PVL model has four parameters: (1) The shape parameter, A, which
determines the shape of the utility function, (2) the loss aversion parameter, w, which
quantiﬁes the weight of losses over rewards, (3) the recency parameter, a, which determines the memory for past expectancies, and (4) the response consistency parameter, c,
which determines the amount of exploitation versus exploration.
The Expectancy Valence model with Prospect Utility function

The EV-PU model is a combination of the EV and PVL models because it uses the utility
function of the PVL model, but all remaining equations of the EV model (i.e., the learning
rule and the trial-dependent sensitivity parameter; Ahn et al., 2008). This construction
results in a model with four parameters: (1) The shape parameter, A, (2) the loss aversion
parameter, w, (3) the recency parameter, a, and (4) the response consistency parameter, c.
Previous Comparisons of Reinforcement-Learning Models
In this section, we review the main results of previous studies that compared components of the EV and PVL models. Despite the fact that these studies used similar
approaches to compare the models (i.e., the post hoc ﬁt criterion, the generalization
criterion, and a simulation method), their conclusions are inconsistent. First, Yechiam
and Busemeyer (2005) compared combinations of eight diﬀerent learning rules with
three diﬀerent choice rules, resulting in 24 diﬀerent models. All 24 models used an
extended version of the utility function of the EV model in which the weight for wins
and losses are estimated separately. To compare these models, Yechiam and Busemeyer
(2005) used the post hoc ﬁt criterion at the individual level and the generalization
criterion at the group level. The post hoc ﬁt criterion compares the ability of a given
model to predict the choice on the next trial (based on the information obtained from
all previous trials) to the same ability of a baseline model.1 This comparison relies on
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to account for the diﬀerences in the number of
model parameters. The generalization criterion assesses the accuracy of a given model
to predict the entire sequence of choices on one task based on parameters estimated
from another task. The authors concluded that the learning rule of the PVL model is
superior to the learning rule of the EV model.
Ahn et al. (2008), on the other hand, compared combinations of the utility functions,
the learning rules, and the sensitivity functions of the EV and PVL models, resulting in
eight diﬀerent models. They used three diﬀerent methods: (1) The post hoc ﬁt criterion
at the individual level, (2) the generalization criterion for one step ahead predictions for
a second task at the individual level, (3) the generalization criterion for predictions of the
entire sequence of choices of a second task.2 The authors concluded that future studies
that aim to disentangle psychological processes underlying the IGT should rely on a
modiﬁed version of the EV model: The utility function of the EV model should be replaced
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by the utility function of the PVL model, but the remaining components of the EV model
should remain unchanged, a suggestion that gave rise to the EV-PU model. Note that in
contrast to Yechiam and Busemeyer (2005), Ahn et al. (2008) did not suggest to replace
the learning rule of the EV model by the learning rule of the PVL model.
Finally, Fridberg et al. (2010) used the post hoc ﬁt criterion to compare the EV model
to a modiﬁed version of the PVL model, that is, the PVL model with learning rule of the
EV model. The authors showed that the modiﬁed PVL model had a better post hoc ﬁt to
data of the control group, whereas the EV model had a better post hoc ﬁt to data of the
experimental group of chronic cannabis abusers. But nevertheless, the EV model had a
worse post hoc ﬁt to the data of the experimental group than the baseline model. Apart
from the post hoc ﬁt criterion, Fridberg et al. (2010) also compared the EV model to the
modiﬁed PVL model by means of a simulation method. In this simulation, the authors
determined the best ﬁtting parameters for each subject and used these parameters
to generate predictions of that subject’s trial-by-trial deck selections. The simulated
proportions of deck selections were then compared to the observed proportions. The
results showed that the modiﬁed PVL model simulated the observed choice patterns
of both groups more accurately than the EV model. The authors thus concluded that
the modiﬁed PVL model better accounts for psychological processes underlying the
IGT than the EV model.
To sum up, previous studies failed to ﬁnd a consistent advantage of one model over
its competitors. However, they all showed that neither the pure EV model nor the pure
PVL model should be accepted as the default model to describe IGT data. Instead, previous studies recommended to use diﬀerent combinations of the EV and PVL models, but
it is still unclear which exact combination is most favorable.
A possible reason for the inconsistencies in previous comparisons of RL models
might be that these studies based their analyses on data sets that show diﬀerent choice
patterns. Whereas healthy participants in the study of Ahn et al. (2008) showed a preference for the safe decks (that is, decks C and D) over the risky decks (that is, decks A and B),
healthy participants of Fridberg et al. (2010) and Yechiam and Busemeyer (2005) showed
a preference for the decks with infrequent losses (decks B and D) over the decks with
frequent losses (decks A and C). Hence it seems that comparisons of components of the
EV and PVL models yield conclusions that depend on the observed choice pattern. This
indicates that some choice patterns might be more accurately ﬁtted by components of the
EV model, whereas other choice patterns might be more accurately ﬁtted by components
of the PVL model. This indication has already been touched upon brieﬂy by Yechiam and
Busemeyer (2005) who demonstrated that the EV model fails to predict a strong preference for bad deck B. This ﬁnding has been supported by Fridberg et al. (2010)’s simulation
showing that the EV model over-predicts the observed proportion of cards chosen from
decks with high-frequent losses (decks A and C).
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In order to explore systematically the ability of the diﬀerent models to handle a
preference for decks with infrequent losses, we employ the PSP method. This method
systematically assesses the choice patterns predicted by a given model across its entire
parameter space and allows us to investigate whether typical empirical choice patterns occupy a major region of the parameter space (Pitt et al., 2006, 2008). Hence the
results of a PSP study describe how ﬂexible a model is. An ideal model is parsimonious
and generates only those choice patterns that are observed in experiments. A crucial
advantage of PSP over previous methods used to compare RL models (Ahn et al., 2008;
Fridberg et al., 2010; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005)3 is that PSP is a global method enabling
us to assess the full range of choice patterns a model can generate, whereas previous
methods are local methods that are restricted to a particular parameter combination
(Pitt et al., 2006). Our conclusions therefore do not depend on the idiosyncrasies of any
single data set.
Before we can interpret the results of a PSP study, we need to know what choice
patterns are observed empirically. When Bechara et al. (1994) developed the IGT, they
explicitly assumed the existence of at least two choice patterns: Impaired decision makers are assumed to prefer risky decks over safe decks, whereas healthy participants are
assumed to show the reversed choice pattern. However, ﬁndings of several studies go
against this assumption (Caroselli, Hiscock, Scheibel, & Ingram, 2006; Chiu & Lin, 2007; Chiu
et al., 2008; Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006; MacPherson, Phillips, & Della Sala, 2002;
Lin, Chiu, Lee, & Hsieh, 2007; Wilder, Weinberger, & Goldberg, 1998; Yechiam & Busemeyer,
2005). In a recent IGT review article, we showed that healthy participants often display a
preference for decks with infrequent losses over decks with frequent losses (Steingroever,
Wetzels, Horstmann, Neumann, & Wagenmakers, 2013). This choice pattern corresponds
to the one shown in the studies of Fridberg et al. (2010) and Yechiam and Busemeyer
(2005). This suggests that there are at least three diﬀerent types of typical empirical choice
patterns that a model of the IGT should produce across a wide range of parameter settings: (1) Preference for good decks over bad decks, {C, D} {A, B}, (2) Preference for bad
decks over good decks, {A, B}{C, D}, and (3) Preference for decks with infrequent losses
over decks with frequent losses, {B, D}{A, C}. In addition to capturing the rank order of
deck preferences, a good RL model of the IGT should also be able to capture the switches
participants make on the IGT (Zhao & Costello, 2007). In a RL context (Sutton & Barto,
1998), it is assumed that participants ﬁrst explore all decks, and then settle down and
exploit the most proﬁtable ones. This assumption implies that the number of switches
decreases across trials; however, many data sets failed to show a systematic decrease
in the number of switches across trials (Steingroever et al., 2013). It is interesting to see
whether the models also generate a decrease in the number of switches, or whether they
can generate an explorative behavior with many switches.
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In this article, we aim to gain more detailed insights in diﬀerences between RL models
for the IGT and possible reasons for inconsistent results of previous studies comparing
these models. We will therefore compare the EV, PVL, and EV-PU models with respect to
model ﬂexibility.

Comparison of the EV, PVL, and EV-PU Models
Methods
In order to evaluate the ﬂexibility of the three RL models, we performed a PSP study for
each model (Pitt et al., 2006, 2008). The PSP method systematically assesses the choice
patterns predicted by the models across the entire parameter space. To explain PSP, we
use the example of two hypothetical models with two parameters, θ1 and θ2, as shown in
Figure 1. The left panel shows a model that can generate three choice patterns, whereas
the model presented in the right panel is more ﬂexible because it can generate six diﬀerent
choice patterns. A model is overly ﬂexible when it can generate not only all choice patterns that are observed empirically, but also choice patterns that are logically possible,
but never observed. Instead, one should prefer a less ﬂexible model that—ideally—only
generates choice patterns that are also frequently observed in experiments (Pitt et al.,
2006, 2008). In the case of the IGT, such a model is shown in the left panel of Figure 1.
Pitt et al. (2006) describe a new search algorithm to implement PSP. In our implementation we did not use their sophisticated search algorithm, but followed the conceptual idea of PSP, and used a grid search that works as follows: For each model and for
each parameter, we chose 60 values that were equally spaced over the corresponding
Figure 1. The partitioned parameter space of two hypothetical models with two parameters,
θ1 and θ2. Model M1 generates three different patterns. Model M2 is more flexible because
it generates six different patterns. See text for further explanations.
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parameter range. All combinations of these parameter values were used to generate
data for 100 synthetic participants completing a 100-trial IGT. The generated data were
used to compute the average proportions of choices from each deck for each parameter combination. For each parameter combination, the choice proportions were then
sorted in decreasing order to determine the generated rank order of deck preferences.
We deﬁned ﬁve possible choice patterns: (1) Preference for good decks over bad decks,
that is, {C, D}{A, B}, (2) preference for bad decks over good decks, that is, {A, B}{C, D},
(3) preference for decks with infrequent losses over decks with frequent losses, that is,
{B, D}{A, C}, (4) preference for decks with frequent losses over decks with infrequence
losses, that is, {A, C}{B, D}, and (5) remaining choice patterns. This deﬁnition of choice
patterns is labeled in the remainder of this article as “broad deﬁnition of choice patterns.” Finally, we computed for each model the proportion of the parameter space occupied by each generated choice pattern. Even though we deﬁned ﬁve possible types
of choice patterns, we assume based on the theory underlying the IGT (Bechara et al.,
1994, 1997) and our IGT review (Steingroever et al., 2013) that a good model for the
IGT should only generate the ﬁrst three types of choice patterns, as presented in the
left panel of Figure 1.
Note that the above deﬁnition of choice patterns only considers the rank order of the
overall proportions of choices from each deck averaged over 100 repeated data generations with the same parameter combination. This means that it did not matter whether a
model generated, for example, a very strong or a very weak preference for the good decks
over the bad decks. Both generated choice patterns would have been classiﬁed as the
choice pattern “good decks over bad decks,” that is, {C, D}{A, B}. To go beyond this coarse
classiﬁcation, we also analyzed the models’ behavior when confronted with pronounced
deck preferences. To get an indication of pronounced deck preferences shown on the IGT,
we searched our IGT data pool (N = 394) for participants that chose at least 65% cards from
either the good decks, the bad decks, or the decks with infrequent losses (Steingroever et
al., 2013).4 We thus obtained three groups of participants with a pronounced deck preference. For each of these three groups, we computed the mean proportions of choices from
each deck (data are presented in the next section). These mean proportions of choices
from each deck determine our second deﬁnition of choice patterns that is labeled as
“restricted deﬁnition of choice patterns” in the remainder of this article.
We then determined for each model, the proportion of the parameter space that
produced pronounced deck preferences according to the “restricted deﬁnition of choice
patterns.” We compared this theoretical popularity of pronounced deck preferences to
the empirical popularity of deck preferences.
In addition, we determined the mean proportions of switches during the last 50 trials
for all parameter combinations that produced pronounced deck preferences according to
the “restricted deﬁnition of choice patterns,” and compared them to the empirical mean
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proportions of switches. For all analyses in this paper, we scaled the traditional payoﬀs of
the IGT as presented in Table 1 by dividing by 100 (cf. Ahn et al., 2011). The codes for the
PSP studies are available on www.helensteingroever.com.
Results
Broad deﬁnition of choice patterns

Table 3 presents for each model the proportion of the parameter space occupied by each
of the ﬁve diﬀerent types of choice patterns. From this table, it is evident that the number of diﬀerent choice patterns a model can produce does not diﬀer between the three
models under consideration. However, if we consider the partitioned parameter spaces,
we detect substantial diﬀerences between the models: In the case of the EV model, the
choice pattern “good decks over bad decks” is the most central to its overall performance,
as it occupies the largest part of its parameter space. The second largest part of its parameter space is occupied by the choice pattern “bad decks over good decks.” However,
the choice pattern “infrequent losses over frequent losses” is only generated over a very
minor part of its parameter space.
Table 3. Proportions of choice patterns generated by each model.
Choice pattern

Proportion of all choice patterns
EV

PVL

EV-PU

Good ≻ bad decks

{C, D}≻{A, B}

.585

.427

.661

Bad ≻ good decks

{A, B}≻{C, D}

.153

.005

.005

Infr. ≻ frequent losses

{B, D}≻{A, C}

.075

.363

.181

Frequent ≻ infr. losses

{A, C}≻{B, D}

.099

.003

.003

.089

.202

.151

Remaining

Just as the EV model, the PVL model produces the choice pattern “good decks over
bad decks” over the largest part of its parameter space. But in contrast to the EV model,
the PVL model also generates the choice pattern “infrequent losses over frequent losses”
over a large part of its parameter space. Note that it seems almost incidental that the PVL
model produces a preference for the bad decks. Not only does this choice pattern occupy
a small region of the parameter space, but larger regions are produced by choice patterns
that are not empirically observed, that is, choice patterns labeled as “remaining.”
Among the three RL models, the EV-PU model shows the strongest preference for the
choice pattern “good decks over bad decks.” Hence its parameter space is very unequally
partitioned among the ﬁve diﬀerent types of choice patterns. The two next largest parts
of its parameter space are occupied by the choice pattern “infrequent losses over frequent
losses” and by “remaining” choice patterns.
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Since the EV model generates the choice pattern “infrequent losses over frequent
losses,” and the PVL and EV-PU models the choice pattern “bad decks over good decks”
only within a very small region of the parameter space, we have grounds to conclude that
these choice patterns are uncharacteristic of the models, and are thus almost irrelevant to
their overall performance (Pitt et al., 2006). These ﬁndings are especially relevant because
the choice pattern “infrequent losses over frequent losses” is often observed in healthy
participants (Steingroever et al., 2013), and the choice pattern “bad decks over good
decks” is thought to be characteristic in patients with lesions to the vmPFC (Bechara et
al., 1994, 1997).
Restricted deﬁnition of choice patterns

Table 4 shows the mean proportions of choices from each deck and the mean proportions
of switches during the last 50 trials of three groups of healthy participants who showed
a pronounced preference for either the good decks ((C + D) ≥ .65), the bad decks ((A + B)
≥ .65), or the decks with infrequent losses ((B+D) ≥ .65). Participants classiﬁed into one
of these three groups were selected out of our IGT data pool (N = 394) (Steingroever et
al., 2013). By using the .65-criterion, we include participants with pronounced deck preferences and exclude participants with random choice behaviors. Note that 53.6% of all
participants in our data pool showed a pronounced deck preference, and made at least
65% choices from the two most preferred decks. This empirical popularity of pronounced
deck preferences underscores how important it is that an RL model for the IGT is able to
produce such choice patterns. Table 4 also contains for each group the mean proportions
of switches during the last 50 trials and statistics quantifying the distribution of switches in
each group, that is, the interquartile range and the minimum and maximum proportions
of switches during the last 50 trials. This information is visualized by the boxplots shown in
the ﬁrst column of Figure 2. From the table and the ﬁgure, it is evident that, in general, in
all three groups participants switch frequently. However, the interquartile ranges and the
Table 4. Mean proportions of choices from each deck and mean proportions of switches
during the last 50 trials of healthy participants showing a pronounced deck preference.
Healthy participants are selected out of data pool (N = 394) reported by Steingroever et
al. (2013).
Choice
pattern

N

Deck A
[sd]

Deck B
[sd]

Deck C
[sd]

Deck D
[sd]

Switches during the last 50 trials
[25%, 75% quantile] (min, max)

(C + D) ≥ .65

54

.10 [.05]

.14 [.05]

.36 [.17]

.40 [.14]

.35 [.08, .52]
(0.00, 0.96)

(A + B) ≥ .65

18

.25 [.07]

.52 [.11]

.11 [.05]

.12 [.06]

.43 [.31, .58]
(0.10, 0.86)

(B + D) ≥ .65

139

.12 [.05]

.37 [.12]

.13 [.05]

.39 [.12]

.47 [.28, .66]
(0.02, 1.00)
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Figure 2. Boxplots of observed and generated proportions of switches during the last 50
trials. Each row presents the results for different choice patterns: First row: Pronounced
preference for the good decks; second row: Pronounced preference for the bad decks; third
row: Pronounced preference for the decks with infrequent losses. The first column presents
the switches of 211 healthy participants selected out of our IGT data pool (Steingroever
et al., 2013) (cf. Table 4). The remaining columns present the switches generated by the
EV, PVL, and EV-PU models (cf. Table 5). A cell is unfilled if the corresponding model fails
to generate the corresponding choice pattern.

minimum and maximum proportions of switches during the last 50 trials show that there
is also a large variability in the proportions of switches, such that the switches of healthy
participants vary between no switches at all to switches on every trial. This tendency to
switch frequently, but also the large individual diﬀerences in the switch behavior of healthy
participants are illustrated by Figures 3, 7, and 10 which show the trial-by-trial choices of
healthy participants with a pronounced preference for the good decks, bad decks, and
decks with infrequent losses, respectively. The deck selection proﬁles of all healthy participants that showed a pronounced deck preference, that is, at least 65% choices from
the two most preferred decks, can be found in the online appendix.5
The mean proportions of choices shown in Table 4 were used to investigate whether
the models can also generate these pronounced deck preferences. This means that we
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Table 5. Proportion of choice patterns generated by each model that satisfy the “restricted
definition of choice patterns”. Note that this definition is only based on the mean proportions of switches of the two strongest preferred decks (second column). For the selected
choice patterns, the corresponding mean and standard deviation of the model parameters,
and the mean proportions of switches during the last 50 trials are presented.
Model Choice Proportion
pattern of all choice
patterns
EV

w [sd]

a [sd]

C ≥ .36, .00027
D ≥ .40

.45 [.04]

.04 [.02]

3.76 [0.67] .020
[.0016, .017]
(.00020, .19)

A ≥ .25, .00013
B ≥ .52

.04 [.03]

.15 [.07]

2.66 [0.49] .032
[.00060, .013]
(.00, .35)

B ≥ .37,
D ≥ .39
PVL

EV-PU

A [sd]

c [sd]

Switches during the
last 50 trials
[25%, 75% quantile]
(min, max)

none

C ≥ .36, .010
D ≥ .40

.66 [.22]

.74 [.41]

.78 [.16]

3.21 [1.14] .0065
[.0002, .0054]
(.00, .34)

A ≥ .25, .0000035
B ≥ .52

.92 [.07]

.02 [.03]

.95 [.05]

0.79 [0.15] .0018
[.00, .0034]
(.00, .015)

B ≥ .37,
D ≥ .39

.29 [.25]

.46 [.76]

.50 [.29]

2.41 [1.24] .042
[.0020, .0468]
(.00, .46)

.66 [.21]

.63 [.34]

.29 [.19]

3.41 [1.00] .067
[.014, .092]
(.00, .46)

.17 [.19]

.52 [.42]

.30 [.22]

2.70 [0.97] .10
[.0150, .130]
(.00, .67)

.016

C ≥ .36, .0019
D ≥ .40
A ≥ .25, none
B ≥ .52
B ≥ .37,
D ≥ .39

.0080

searched the results of the PSP studies for those parameter combinations that yielded
pronounced deck preference as presented in Table 4, that is, a pronounced preference
for the good decks (C ≥ .36,D ≥ .40), a pronounced preference for the bad decks (A ≥
.25,B ≥ .52), and a pronounced preference for the decks with infrequent losses (B ≥
.37,D ≥ .39). Table 5 presents for each model the proportion of all choice patterns that
satisﬁed this “restricted deﬁnition of choice patterns.” The table also presents the mean
and standard deviation of the parameter combinations that generated these pronounced
deck preferences, and the corresponding generated proportions of switches during
the last 50 trials.
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Figure 3. Deck selection profiles of four healthy participants showing a preference for the
good decks. The filled circles indicate the occurrence of rewards and losses together; the
empty circles indicate the occurrence of only rewards.

Figure 4. Deck selection profiles of four synthetic participants showing a preference for
the good decks (generated by the EV model; w = 0.42, a = 0.03, c = 5.00).
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Figure 5. Deck selection profiles of four synthetic participants showing a preference for
the good decks (generated by the PVL model; A = .97,w = .93, a = .93, c = .59).

Figure 6. Deck selection profiles of four synthetic participants showing a preference for the
good decks (generated by the EV-PU model; A = 0.81,w = 0.34, a = 0.24, c = 5.00).
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Figure 7. Deck selection profiles of four healthy participants showing a preference for the
bad decks.

Figure 8. Deck selection profiles of four synthetic participants showing a preference for
the bad decks (generated by the EV model; w = 0.00, a = 0.25, c = 1.61).
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Figure 9. Deck selection profiles of four synthetic participants showing a preference for
the bad decks (generated by the PVL model; A = 1.00,w = 0.00, a = 0.88, c = 0.76).

Figure 10. Deck selection profiles of four healthy participants showing a preference for
the decks with infrequent losses.
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Figure 11. Deck selection profiles of four synthetic participants showing a preference for the
decks with infrequent losses (generated by the PVL model; A = .07,w = .25, a = .88, c = .34).

Figure 12. Deck selection profiles of four synthetic participants showing a preference for
the decks with infrequent losses (generated by the EV-PU model; A = 0.03,w = 0.08, a =
0.36, c = 4.66).
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From this table, it seems at a ﬁrst glance that all models are able to generate all
pronounced deck preferences over a minor part of their parameter space, except for the
EV model that fails to generate a pronounced preference for the decks with infrequent
losses and for the EV-PU model that fails to generate a pronounced preference for the bad
decks.6 For the remaining two pronounced choice patterns of the EV and EV-PU models
and for all three pronounced choice patterns of the PVL model, it is important to note that
only minor parts of the parameter spaces of all models are occupied by the choice patterns featuring pronounced deck preferences even though they are frequently observed
in experiments. For instance, 139 healthy participants out of our data pool (35.3%) show
a pronounced preference for the decks with infrequent losses ((B + D) ≥ .65). However,
the EV model completely fails to generate such a pronounced preference for the decks
with infrequent losses, the PVL model only generates this choice pattern over 1.6% of its
parameter space, and the EV-PU model only over 0.8% of its parameter space.
Next to considering the proportion of the parameter space occupied by each choice
pattern featuring pronounced deck preferences, it is crucial to consider the proportions
of switches during the last 50 trials predicted by each model. The last column of Table 5
shows for each model and each choice pattern separately, the proportions of switches
during the last 50 trials averaged over all selected parameter combinations, and statistics
quantifying the corresponding distribution of switches, that is, the interquartile range
and the minimum and maximum proportions of switches during the last 50 trials. This
information is visualized by the last three columns of Figure 2. When comparing the generated and observed mean proportions of switches during the last 50 trials, it is apparent
that the models dramatically underestimate the observed proportions of switches, that
is, the generated mean proportions of switches equal or fall below .10 for all models and
all choice patterns, whereas the observed mean proportions of switches equal or exceed
.35 for all choice patterns (Tables 4 and 5). In addition, only in the case of the EV-PU model
and the choice pattern featuring a pronounced preference for the good decks do the
interquartile range of the observed proportions of switches and generated proportions
of switches overlap; for all other choice patterns and models, the interquartile ranges of
the generated proportions of switches lie below the interquartile ranges of the observed
proportions of switches (Figure 2, Table 4 and 5).
Figure 2 and Table 5 also reveal important diﬀerences between the models: First, the
EV model performs worse among the three models; even if we neglect the generated proportions of switches during the last 50 trials and only consider the generated rank order of
deck preferences, the EV model fails to generate a frequency-of-losses eﬀect. In addition,
it predicts, among the three models, the smallest number of switches when generating a
pronounced preference for the good decks over the bad decks. In fact, the deck selection
proﬁles that were generated with the EV model and those parameter values that yielded
the largest number of switches and a pronounced preference for the good decks, display
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few switches during the last 50 trials and long stays on the same deck for four synthetic
participants showing a pronounced preference for the good decks (Figure 4). This strong
exploitation is due to the high consistency parameter, c, and the low recency parameter,
a, suggesting almost no forgetting and very weak recency eﬀects. However, with respect
to the choice pattern featuring a pronounced preference for the bad decks, the EV model
outperforms its competitors. Even though the EV model in general underestimates the mean
proportions of switches during the last 50 trials, it best approximates the observed mean
proportion of choices among the three models (Figure 2, Tables 4 and 5). In fact, the deck
selection proﬁles that were generated with the EV model and those parameter values that
yielded the largest number of switches and a pronounced preference for the bad decks,
strongly resemble the deck selection proﬁles of healthy participants (Figures 7 and 8).
Second, the PVL model outperforms the EV model because it can generate a
frequency-of-losses eﬀect, and for pronounced preferences from the good decks or the
decks with infrequent losses, the PVL model’s largest generated proportions of switches
lies in interquartile ranges of the observed proportions of switches (cf. Figure 2, Tables
4 and 5). This suggests that for very rare parameter combinations the PVL model meets
both empirical regularities: the rank order of deck preferences and the proportions of
switches. This is illustrated by Figures 5 and 11 showing deck selection proﬁles featuring
pronounced preferences for the good decks and decks with infrequent losses, respectively.
These deck selection proﬁles were generated with the PVL model and those parameter
values that yielded the largest number of switches and a pronounced preference for the
good decks or the decks with infrequent losses. However, the deck selection proﬁles
featuring a pronounced preference for the bad decks show that, for this choice pattern,
the PVL fails to meet both empirical regularities in that it generates almost no switches
during the last 50 trials (Figure 9). This is supported by Figure 2 and Tables 4 and 5 showing that, for choice patterns featuring a pronounced preference from the bad decks, the
largest generated proportions of switches is smaller than the 25% quantile of the observed
proportions of switches.
Third, the EV-PU model is clearly inferior to the EV and PVL models with respect to the
choice pattern featuring a pronounced preference for the bad decks. But it outperforms its
competitors with respect to the choice patterns featuring a pronounced preference of the
good decks and the decks with infrequent losses; even though all models underestimate
the observed proportions of switches during the last 50 trials, the EV-PU model comes
closest to the observed proportions of switches. This indicates that for very rare parameter combinations the EV-PU model can account for both empirical regularities: the rank
order of deck preferences and the proportions of switches. This is illustrated by Figures 6
and 12 showing the deck selection proﬁles of synthetic participants with a pronounced
preference for the good decks and for the decks with infrequent losses, respectively, that
were generated with the EV-PU model and with those parameter values that yielded the
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largest number of switches. A surprising ﬁnding of these deck selection proﬁles, is that the
EV-PU model predicts many switches during the last 50 trials, but a long stay at the same
deck at the ﬁrst half of the task. This might be due to the interaction between the high
consistency parameter, c, that predicts strong exploitation, and the small recency parameter, a, that strongly discounts all past expectancies and disables strong learning eﬀects.
To conclude, many healthy participants out of our data pool (53.6%) showed pronounced deck preferences, that is, a pronounced preference for good decks ((C + D) ≥ .65),
a pronounced preference for bad decks ((A + B) ≥ .65), or a pronounced preference for decks
with infrequent losses ((B + D) ≥ .65) (Table 4). This empirical popularity of pronounced deck
preferences is not reﬂected by the three RL models; the models produce choice patterns
that satisfy the “restricted deﬁnition of choice patterns” only within minor parts of their parameter spaces (Table 5). In addition, healthy participants in general show many switches
during the last 50 trials. However, the RL models in general predict that participants, who
show pronounced deck preferences switch vary rarely during the last 50 trials; all generated
mean proportions of switches during the last 50 trials equal or fall below .10 whereas the
observed mean proportions of switches lie around .40. Moreover, there are large individual
diﬀerences in the proportions of switches of healthy participants, such that the switches
of healthy participants vary between no switches at all to switches on every trial. However,
the RL models fail to generate large proportions of switches, that is, none of the models can
generate more than 67% switches during the last 50 trials.

Discussion
This article compared the EV, PVL, and EV-PU models with respect to model ﬂexibility using
parameter space partitioning. We used two diﬀerent deﬁnitions of choice patterns; the broad
deﬁnition allowed us to get an indication of how central each of the choice patterns are to the
models’ overall performance, and the restricted deﬁnition allowed us to assess the models’
data-ﬁtting potential when confronted with data featuring pronounced deck preferences.
The analysis based on the broad deﬁnition of choice patterns showed that the partitioned parameter spaces of the three models diﬀer. We thus learned that the choice pattern “good decks over bad decks” is the most central to all models. But the popularity of
this choice pattern diﬀers between the models; the part of the parameter space occupied
by this choice pattern is the largest in the case of the the EV-PU model (66.1%), and the
smallest in the case of the PVL model (42.7%). Another important diﬀerence between the
three models is that the choice pattern “infrequent losses over frequent losses” is almost
irrelevant to the overall performance of the EV model, whereas the choice pattern “bad
decks over good decks” is almost irrelevant to the overall performance of the PVL and EVPU models. We were thus able to detect inconsistencies between the empirical frequency
of each choice pattern and the frequency predicted by each model.
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The analysis based on the restricted deﬁnition of choice patterns showed that all three
models dramatically underestimate the empirical popularity of pronounced deck preferences, that is, a pronounced preference for good decks (C ≥ .36, D ≥ .40), a pronounced
preference for bad decks (A ≥ .25, B ≥ .52), and a pronounced preference for decks with
infrequent losses (B ≥ .37, D ≥ .39). Another ﬁnding of the analysis based on the restricted
deﬁnition of choice patterns was that the EV model is the worst performing model among
the three models that were compared in this article; it fails to generate a frequency-oflosses eﬀect, and predicts very few switches when generating a pronounced preference
for the good decks. Yet, a major advantage of the EV model is that it outperforms its competitors with respect to the choice pattern featuring a pronounced preference for the bad
decks because the EV model can generate the largest range of switches during the last
50 trials. The EV-PU model, on the other hand, is the best model; comparing the ability of
the three models to generate choice patterns featuring pronounced deck preferences,
we found that all models underestimate the empirical popularity of such choice patterns,
but also the proportions of switches during the last 50 trials; however, among the three
models the EV-PU model best approximates the observed proportions of switches. Yet, a
major disadvantage of the EV-PU model is that it fails to generate a pronounced preference
for the bad decks (A ≥ .25, B ≥ .52). Thus, none of the three RL models met all empirical
regularities, that is, pronounced deck preferences from either the good decks, the bad
decks, or the decks with infrequent losses, and many switches during the last 50 trials.
The results of the PSP studies reveal important diﬀerences in the data-ﬁtting potential
of the three RL models. These ﬁndings are useful for future applications of the models.
Based on the behavioral results, researches can decide which model is most appropriate.
For instance, our ﬁndings suggest that the EV model should not be used if the data set is
characterized by a strong preference for the decks with infrequent losses.
The diﬀerences in the data-ﬁtting potential of the three models might explain why
previous comparisons of RL models found inconsistent results. Our ﬁnding that the EV
model fails to generate a frequency-of-losses eﬀect is in line with the studies of Fridberg
et al. (2010) and Yechiam and Busemeyer (2005). These two studies show that the EV
model is outperformed by its competitors when participants show a strong preference
for decks with infrequent losses (decks B and D) over decks with frequent losses (deck A
and C). However, in the study of Ahn et al. (2008) participants prefer the good decks over
the bad decks and the authors recommend to use the EV-PU model instead of the PVL
and EV models. This ﬁnding is also in line with our PSP studies because the choice pattern
“good decks over bad decks” is the most central in the case of the EV-PU model.
An important advantage of PSP is that it is a global analysis technique augmenting
local methods that have previously been used to compare RL models (Pitt et al., 2006, 2008).
Whereas local methods, such as the post hoc ﬁt criterion or the generalization criterion, evaluate a model’s performance at a single point of a model’s parameter space, global methods
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such as PSP help us to determine the full range of choice patterns that a model can generate
by varying its parameter values (see also Vanpaemel, 2009). This means that we can obtain
a global perspective on a model’s data-ﬁtting potential. In addition, PSP allows us to draw
conclusions about model ﬂexibility that transcend the idiosyncrasies of any particular data
set. We can use the results of the presented PSP studies to predict how well each of the three
models will ﬁt a certain data set only based on the behavioral ﬁndings. Thus, based on the
observed choice pattern, we can decide which model is most appropriate.
One might argue that it is not surprising that the EV model fails to outperform its
competitors, a failure that is due to the EV model having one free parameter less than its
competitors. This implies that our comparison of RL models might not be fair because PSP
does not correct for the number of free parameters. Even though we agree that PSP might
disadvantage the EV model, it is important to bear in mind that previous comparisons of
RL models based on methods that corrected for the number of free parameters (e.g., the
post hoc ﬁt criterion), also failed to ﬁnd that the EV model is superior to its competitors
(Ahn et al., 2008; Fridberg et al., 2010; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005). In addition, our goal
was not a model-selection exercise in which the emphasis is on relative performance.
Instead, we were primarily conceded with absolute measure of the models’ performance,
that is do the models account for the key regularities of the experimental data?
It should also be noted that the PSP results of this paper should be interpreted carefully. PSP gives an indication of how central choice patterns are to the overall performance
of the model. But, when a model generates a certain choice pattern only over a small part
of the parameter space, it is premature to conclude that the model cannot generate this
choice pattern at all. Instead, we can only conclude that this choice pattern is not central
to the model’s overall performance. Moreover, a model that generates nonhuman-like
choice patterns for certain parameter combinations is not necessarily inadequate.
The ﬁndings of this article oﬀer several suggestions for future research. First, we
found that the three RL models have diﬃculties in generating pronounced deck preferences, even though these choice patterns are frequently found in empirical research on
the IGT. This suggests that a better model is required if researchers aim to decompose
performance on the IGT in its constituent psychological processes using RL models. Such a
model should be able to produce the large diversity of choice patterns shown on the IGT,
and it should also be able to produce the switches made on the IGT. However, developing
a model that well accounts for IGT data might be very challenging because there are large
individual diﬀerences in the data, and, at the same time, there are only a small number of
trials providing a limited amount of information (Steingroever et al., 2013).
A second possible approach would be to work on the level of the task. The IGT
is a popular neuropsychological task that has been applied in many studies to assess
decision-making deﬁcits of clinical populations (Bowman, Evans, & Turnbull, 2005; Toplak,
Sorge, Benoit, West, & Stanovich, 2010). Yet, the IGT has been confronted by a substantial
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number of criticism (Chiu & Lin, 2007; Chiu et al., 2008; Dunn et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2007;
Steingroever et al., 2013). It is therefore desirable to develop a neuropsychological task
that measures risky decision making in an experimental context and that circumvents
some of the problems of the IGT. As such, the new task should reduce the within-group
variability resulting in more homogeneous response proﬁles.
Third, no matter in which direction future research proceeds, it is important that researchers rigorously assess absolute model ﬁt. To date, more than 30 studies have ﬁt the
EV or PVL models to IGT data to compare two or more groups (Agay et al., 2010; Ahn et
al., 2011; Bass & Nussbaum, 2010; Bishara et al., 2009; Brambilla et al., 2012; Brown et al.,
2012; Busemeyer & Stout, 2002; Cella et al., 2012; de Visser et al., 2010; Escartin et al., 2012;
Farah et al., 2008; Fridberg et al., 2010; Gullo & Stieger, 2011; Hochman et al., 2010; Isella
et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2006; Kester et al., 2006; Kjome et al., 2010; Lane et al., 2006;
Lev et al., 2008; Lovallo et al., 2006; Peatﬁeld et al., 2012; Premkumar et al., 2008; Sevy et
al., 2006, 2007; Stout et al., 2004; van den Bos et al., 2009; Wood et al., 2005; Yechiam et
al., 2005; Yechiam, Hayden, et al., 2008; Yechiam, Kanz, et al., 2008; Yechiam et al., 2010).
About one third of these studies did not report the model ﬁt at all. The remaining studies
assessed the model ﬁt by comparing the EV or PVL model to a baseline model and thus
obtained a ﬁt statistic, e.g., G2 or BIC (for example, Farah et al., 2008; Yechiam, Kanz, et al.,
2008). The problem of such ﬁt statistics is that they only assess the ﬁt of one model relative to the ﬁt of another model. Another approach is to plot the observed and predicted
choices as a function of trial number (Busemeyer & Stout, 2002; Wood et al., 2005). These
two studies, however, collapsed choice proportions over the two good decks, a procedure
that leads to a loss of potentially diagnostic information. To determine whether a model
ﬁts the data well, it is important to assess the model ﬁt for each deck separately as a function of the trial number. Only a good model ﬁt allows us to draw valid conclusion from
the model parameters. Especially comparisons of several groups are only meaningful if
the model ﬁts the data of all groups well.
The ﬁndings of this paper showed that the search for an IGT model has not yet come
to an end. Applying PSP to three diﬀerent RL models, we have obtained a deeper understanding of the models’ behavior. The results of the PSP studies allow us to predict each
model’s data-ﬁtting potential by only considering behavioral characteristics of the data,
that is, mean proportions of choices from each deck and mean proportions of switches
during the last 50 trials. Each model was demonstrated to provide a good ﬁt to only a
restricted number of choice patterns. In particular, the EV model provided a poor ﬁt to
choice patterns featuring a preference for decks with infrequent losses, whereas the PVL
and EV-PU models provided a poor ﬁt to choice patterns featuring a pronounced preference
for the bad decks with many switches. This work suggests that a deeper understanding
of risky decision making requires a better interplay between the current version of the
IGT and RL models.
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Notes
1. The baseline model assumes that a participant’s probability of choosing a given deck
on a given trial equals the overall proportion of choices the participant actually made
from that deck.
2. For the third method, data was generated for each subject individually, but eventually averaged over all subjects to compute the predicted proportions of choices from
each deck on each trial.
3. See Yechiam and Busemeyer (2008) and Yechiam and Ert (2007) for newly developed
methods to compare RL models applied to experiments with two and three choice
options, respectively.
4. Note that we did not use the data of Rodríguez-Sánchez et al. (2005), and Toplak et al.
(2005) because we have received their data only in bins of several trials.
5. The deck selection profiles can be downloaded here: https://dl.dropbox.
com/u/12798592/DeckSelectionProfilesPSP.zip
6. The EV model already fails to generate a weak frequency-of-losses effect with 28%
choices from each decks B and D. The EV-PU model already fails to produce a weak
preference for the bad decks with 27% choices from each decks A and B.
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